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Where Do We Stand on the Rome I Regulation? 






Considerable parts of the private international law of the European Union member states have nowadays been shaped by the EC law-makers. The activity of the Community institutions particularly intensified after the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997 which introduced their competence in adopting “measures in the field of judicial cooperation in civil matters having cross-border implications” in order to establish an area of freedom, security and justice.​[1]​ A number of conventions in the area of international civil procedure,​[2]​ as well as in the field of insolvency law have already been converted into Regulations.​[3]​ Besides, a number of newly drafted regulations have been enforced in the last couple of years in this field.​[4]​ 
EU legislation continues to play an important role in the field of private international law. Legal instruments relating to conflict-of-laws aspects are even being currently discussed in various subject-matters.​[5]​ Since 2003 the conversion of the 1980 Rome Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations into an EC Regulation (Rome I) has also been put on the agenda. 
The analysis in this contribution is focused on the recent developments in the drafting process of this regulation. It compares the provisions of the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council of 2005 (hereinafter: Proposal)​[6]​ with the Compromise package by the Presidency of 13 April 2007 (hereinafter: Compromise).​[7]​ It should be emphasized that the Compromise covers only certain matters to be included in Rome I, whereas a number of issues are to be further discussed. It seems appropriate to conclude that, with respect to the issues that do form part of the Compromise, only those adjustments will be permitted which, after the finalising of the discussion on the remaining part of the text, appear necessary for the coherence of the particular provision.​[8]​ 




The provision on the scope of application contained in Article 1 of the Rome Convention has to a great extent been retained in both the Proposal and the Compromise.. This provision in the Compromise is entitled “material scope”​[9]​ and in paragraph 1 it follows the wording used in the Proposal with minor changes. As is the case under the Convention, the Regulation shall apply to contractual obligations in civil and commercial matters “in situations involving a conflict of laws”.​[10]​ In both the Proposal and the Compromise it is expressly stated that the Regulation shall not apply to revenue, customs or administrative matters.
	A number of changes regarding paragraph 2 of Article 1 were suggested in the Proposal, in order to align the scope of the Rome I Regulation with the Brussels I Regulation, as well as with the future Rome II instrument.​[11]​ Most of these changes have been retained in the Compromise as well, with some alterations to the wording.​[12]​ 
	Article 1(3) of the Compromise provides that the expression “member state” would mean EU member states excluding Denmark and the United Kingdom, except for the purposes of the application of Article 3(5). Namely, Ireland expressed the will to become a party to the Rome I on a voluntary basis, but the United Kingdom has not decided to do so. In Denmark it would be possible to apply the Rome I Regulation only if Denmark voluntarily introduced it into its national law or if a separate convention was concluded between Denmark and the European Community.    
 	The Compromise retains the principle of “universal application” in Article 2. It provides that the law that is applicable according to the conflict of law rules of the future Regulation will apply regardless of whether or not it is the law of a member state.

3. Choice of law by the parties

3.1. Provisions where no or minor changes are suggested

The parties’ choice of law to govern their contractual relationship remains a primary conflict of law rule under the Proposal (Art. 3 para. 1), as well as in the Compromise (Art. 3 para. 1). Also, all three instruments provide that the choice of law can be made for the whole contract or only a part thereof (dépeçage).​[13]​ 
The same is true with respect to providing the possibility for the parties to alter the choice of law previously made. The Proposal maintains that the rights of third parties and the formal validity of the contract shall not be affected by an alteration of the choice of law made after the conclusion of the contract.​[14]​ In its opinion, the European Economic and Social Committee (ECOSOC) generally welcomed such an emphasis on the freedom of the parties’ choice of applicable law at any time. Yet, it expressed the concern that there would be “a potential threat to the protection of consumers, who might be unable to fully anticipate the consequences of such a step”.​[15]​ Therefore, the Committee suggested that when drafting the relevant provisions of the Rome I, the approach taken in Article 17 para. 1 of the Brussels I Regulation was to be followed, so that a choice of law to govern consumer contracts should only be allowed after a dispute has arisen. Only then would the consumer become alert and “act more cautiously” in the view of the ECOSOC. This suggestion by the Committee might be put in a wider context of attempting to accommodate the strict and a rather rigid system of “conflict of law rules” to the situations in which the interests of a weaker party are sufficiently protected. The wording of the provision in Article 3(3) of the Proposal has been closely followed in Article 3(3) of the Compromise. The freedom to choose a different applicable law at any time has been fully maintained in these provisions.​[16]​    
There are no substantial changes suggested regarding Article 3 paragraph 4 of the Convention. The existence and validity of the parties’ choice of the applicable law shall be determined according to the relevant provisions relating to substantive and formal validity in Articles 8 and 9, and the incapacity of a party to conclude a contract in Article 11.​[17]​ This provision is contained in paragraph 6 of the Proposal and of the Compromise respectively.
There is no indication either in the Proposal or in the Compromise that the provision on the mandatory rules contained in Article 3 paragraph 3 of the Convention should be altered. This provision relates to cases where a foreign law has been chosen by the parties in a purely “domestic” contractual relationship, whether or not accompanied by a choice of a foreign court. In other words, these are cases where a choice of foreign law is the only “foreign” element in the contract between the parties. Obviously, the Convention is intended to be applied in such circumstances, considering the determination of the field of application in Article 1 paragraph 1 of the Convention. A choice for a foreign law can be validly made according to the provisions of the Convention, but the mandatory provisions of the law of the country with which the case and the parties are solely connected, are not excluded by such a choice. This approach has been maintained in both the Proposal and the Compromise. In the Proposal the text has remained virtually unchanged.​[18]​ Although the wording of Article 3 paragraph 4 of the Compromise does differ from the text of both the Convention and the Proposal,​[19]​ it does make clear that a recital should indicate that no substantial change to Article 3 para. 3 of the Convention is intended.​[20]​
 
3.2. Choice of law made expressly or impliedly
Just as under the Rome Convention, there are no requirements concerning the formal validity of the parties’ choice of applicable law under the Proposal and under the Compromise. Thus, a choice can be made expressly or impliedly.​[21]​ 
According to Article 3(1) of the Convention, “choice must be expressed or demonstrated with reasonable certainty by the terms of the contract or the circumstances of the case”. A similar pattern has been retained in Article 3(1) of the Proposal. Thus, the choice must be expressed or demonstrated with reasonable certainty in the same manner as defined in the Convention, only the words ”behaviour of the parties” were added in the Proposal. Thus, the terms of the contract, the behaviour of the parties and the circumstances of the case can be taken into consideration in determining their choice of the applicable law, according to the Proposal.​[22]​ Obviously, it is the expression of the idea that the will of the parties should always be sought and upheld whenever possible. 
Although the ECOSOC generally approved this approach in the Proposal, it also expressed its concern that “when applying this standard in practice, courts could attempt to establish a hypothetical will of the parties without adequate evidence to support it”.​[23]​ It recommended clarifying this point in the recitals. The relevant part of this provision has been somewhat changed under the Compromise so as to read: “A contract shall be governed by the law chosen by the parties. The choice shall be made expressly or clearly demonstrated (…) by the terms of the contract (…) or (…) the circumstances of the case.” Although the wording has not been significantly changed under the Compromise, it does seem to leave less room for discretion for the courts when looking for the real intention of the parties in “choosing” the applicable law.​[24]​

3.3. Choice of forum and an implied choice of law

The text of Article 3(1) of the Proposal contains the following rule:

“If the parties have agreed to confer jurisdiction on one ore more courts or tribunals of a Member State to hear and determine disputes that have arisen or may arise out of the contract, they shall also be presumed to have chosen the law of that Member State.”
   
With this provision the Commission opted for the rather outdated principle qui elegit iudicem elegit ius, according to which the parties by choosing a jurisdiction are presumed to have also made a choice for the applicable substantive law. Although it may be accepted in some member states, this rule is expressly rejected by the courts in some jurisdictions.​[25]​  
	In contrast, the text of Article 3(1) of the Compromise does not contain the presumption that the parties’ choice of court implies a determination of the applicable law. Instead it is suggested that a recital should clarify that a forum-selection agreement providing for the jurisdiction of the courts of a member state would be a factor to be considered “in determining whether a choice of law was clearly demonstrated”. 
Although it is generally easier and more practical to apply the law of the forum, the fact that this part of the provision of Article 3(1) is omitted from the Compromise is to be met with approval​[26]​ for several reasons. The wording used in the Proposal suggests that a choice of the court by the parties should be of decisive importance in interpreting the will of the parties regarding the applicable substantive law. Such wording was obviously the result of a desire to bring into line the forum and the law in order to simplify the proceedings and to render a judgment.​[27]​ However, it is difficult to find the reasons why the fact that the parties have made a choice of court would outweigh all other factors that may be relevant in searching for the real intention of the parties in determining the applicable law. As was rightly pointed out by the ECOSOC, such a strict wording might indeed interfere with the intention of the parties.​[28]​ Namely, it is quite likely that the parties will agree on the jurisdiction of the courts in a particular “third” (“neutral”) country because they wish to avoid proceedings before the courts in the country of the counterparty. It does not mean that the parties by making such a choice of court intended that the law of that country would govern the substantive law, in particular if it is otherwise entirely unrelated to the parties and their legal relationship. In these circumstances an express choice of the applicable law by the parties would have become a rather important issue, in order to avoid the consequences of the presumption that “choice of court means a choice of law”.​[29]​ 
Besides, this presumption would not necessarily imply the applicability of the lex fori in all circumstances. Claims arising from pre-contractual obligations can serve as an example. As already mentioned, they are excluded from the scope of application of Rome I and are to be covered by Article 12 of Rome II. According to this provision, the law applicable to pre-contractual obligations will be the law applicable to that contract if it had been entered into. In accordance with the decision of the European Court of Justice of 17 September 2002,​[30]​ claims based on pre-contractual liability are to be characterized as tort for the purposes of ascertaining jurisdiction relying on Article 5(3) of the Brussels I Regulation.
As already mentioned, a deletion of the relevant part of the provision of Article 3(1) in the Compromise discussed supra is to be welcomed.​[31]​ The same is true regarding the suggestion to clarify in a recital that a choice of forum would be a factor to be considered together with other factors in determining whether a choice of law has been made. 
Yet the text suggested for the recital still refers to the agreements conferring exclusive jurisdiction on one or more courts or tribunals in a member state. In the vast majority of cases a court in a member state would be deciding on the relevance of a forum-selection clause for the courts of its own country (thus, the courts in a member state) when searching for the will of the parties regarding the applicable law. Very rarely would a court in an EU member state be required to look for the applicable law to the main contract, while deciding on a contract-related issue.​[32]​ For example, it could be the case when a forum-selection clause is not broad enough to encompass all disputes arising in connection with the main contract. The court seized of the matter could then retain the jurisdiction, but may be required to apply the law governing the contract. In such a case, the parties’ choice of forum would be considered in determining the will of the parties concerning the applicable law only if a forum-selection clause confers jurisdiction on the court or a tribunal in a member state. It is unclear why a distinction should be made between forum-selection clauses providing for the jurisdiction of courts in the member states and those providing for the jurisdiction of courts outside the EU, for the purpose of interpreting the parties’ choice of the applicable law. This is particularly so bearing in mind that principle of the “universal application” of the Rome I Regulation is expressed in Article 2 of the Proposal and of the Compromise. As a matter of principle, it would have been better had the Compromise abandoned this distinction.​[33]​ However, this issue is of little practical importance, considering that the courts of the member states will usually consider the relevance of choice of forum clauses providing for their own jurisdiction, when determining the law applicable to the contract.
	Neither the Proposal nor the Compromise addresses the circumstances in which the jurisdiction of a court of a Member State is based on Article 24 of the Brussels I Regulation. It is questionable whether it would be considered as a choice of forum for the purposes of the application of this provision. Also, it is questionable whether a previous choice of forum should be considered when determining the will of the parties concerning the applicable law, if court proceedings have been commenced on the basis of Article 24 of the Brussels I Regulation. It does not seem appropriate that the courts should consider such an initial choice of forum when establishing the law applicable to the contract, when it was obviously subsequently altered by the conduct of the parties.​[34]​    
Finally, although the Rome I Regulation is intended to be used by the courts in the member states, it may be interesting to briefly compare the approaches used in the Proposal and in the Compromise with the ways of determining the applicable substantive law by arbitrators. This is particularly so bearing in mind that arbitration is an important alternative in resolving disputes arising from international commercial transactions. It should be noted that the principle qui elegit iudicem elegit ius is generally not accepted in arbitration practice.​[35]​ In determining the applicable law in the absence of the parties’ choice, the arbitrators apply various methods. Sometimes they refer to the Rome Convention, although they are not under an obligation to do so. They consider certain provisions of the Convention to be the so-called “general principles of private international law”, as containing the conflict of law accepted in various legal systems worldwide.​[36]​ The incorporation of the assumption “choice of court means choice of law” in the future Regulation would be a retrograde step, as it is certainly not a concept which is widely accepted. It is very unlikely that arbitrators would take the parties’ choice of the place of arbitration to be decisive in determining the real intention of the parties regarding the applicable law.

3.4 Choice for non-national law

The absence of the possibility to choose supranational or a-national rules of law in the 1980 Rome Convention as the law governing the contract was criticized by some scholars.​[37]​ An important change to the text of the Convention was provided in Article 3 paragraph 2 of the Proposal, according to which the parties were permitted to choose a non-national law.​[38]​ The wording used was supposed to indicate that the parties were authorized to choose the UNIDROIT Principles or Principles of European Contract Law, as well as “possible future optional Community instruments”.​[39]​ However, a reference to the lex mercatoria was excluded as it was considered to be insufficiently precise. A choice of “private codifications not adequately recognised by the international community” was excluded as well.​[40]​ 
The same provision also dealt with the issues not expressly regulated by such principles chosen by the parties. Thereby an approach similar to the one applied in Article 7(2) of the 1980 Vienna Convention on the International Sales of Goods was applied. It provided that such a question should be governed by the general principles underling them or in accordance with the law that would be applicable under the Regulation in the absence of the parties’ choice.
Although the possibility to apply a non-national law was met with approval by many, including the ECOSOC,​[41]​ it has been omitted from the text of the Compromise. It is to be regretted that an opportunity has been missed to give the courts in the EU member states the possibility to apply commercial ‘codifications’, such as the UNIDROIT Principles, the Principles of European Contract Law, which are specifically designed for international transactions. This is particularly so bearing in mind the efforts to harmonise or even unify contract law within the EU, so that the parties could choose Community civil law once it has been created.​[42]​ By providing such an opportunity, Community Private International Law would be appropriately adapted to the needs of modern business.​[43]​ 
It is unclear which considerations induced the Council and the Parliament to omit the text contained in the initial Proposal.​[44]​ This is particularly so bearing in mind that the vast majority of states, including EU countries, have a very different approach regarding the freedom to choose the law in arbitration. Namely, the parties are generally given a full opportunity to choose a set of rules which they consider to be the most appropriate, including a-national rules and the lex mercatoria. ​[45]​ More importantly, many statutes, as well as arbitration rules, do not require arbitrators to apply the conflict of law method in determining the applicable substantive law in the absence of the parties’ choice, but may use the so-called voie directe. Thereby, the arbitrators may apply ‘rules of law’ that they consider appropriate, including non-national rules of law and the lex mercatoria. ​[46]​ 
It is undesirable to maintain such a discrepancy in determining the law applicable to commercial transactions between the courts and arbitrators in the EU.​[47]​ Consequently, if the future Rome I Regulation follows the Compromise, the choice of the Principles of Contract Law is to be qualified as a so-called materiellrechtliche Verweisung. The Principles are part of the contract terms, whereas a kollisionrechtliche Verweisung (the Principles are the lex contractus which means that the mandatory rules of the otherwise applicable law are excluded) cannot effectively be made. In contrast, the commercial parties in arbitration are allowed to refer to such Principles when choosing the law to govern their commercial transaction. In other words, the parties may have an additional reason to prefer their disputes to be resolved by arbitration rather than by national courts. Even though there is a favourable enforcement regime in the EU under the Brussels I Regulation, which is comparable to the 1958 New York Convention relating to the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards, the parties’ freedom to choose the law is limited in court proceedings under the future Rome I. It is understandable that the EU legislator may be reluctant to go as far as to provide the opportunity for national judges to apply non-national law in the absence of the parties’ choice. Yet, it would be more appropriate to fully incorporate the principle of party autonomy and provide the business community in the EU with the same degree of freedom as they have in arbitration when choosing the applicable substantive law. Hence, the recent submission that the choice of non-state law should at least be possible between parties to a commercial contract (so-called B2B contracts)​[48]​ should be supported. Finally, from a practical point of view, in some cases it may be easier to determine the contents of e.g., the UNIDROIT Principles than the contents of “foreign” law. 

4. Limitations to the parties’ choice





Just as under the Convention, there are a number of provisions contained in the Proposal that limit the parties’ choice of the applicable law. They are distinct in nature and they limit the choice of law in different ways. The provisions contained in Article 3 paragraphs 4 and 5 relating to the application of imperative norms are to be distinguished from the provisions on mandatory rules contained in Article 8 of the Proposal.
 The provision in Article 3 paragraph 3 of the Convention has already been addressed. It deals with situations in which a choice of foreign law is the only “international” element in an otherwise purely “domestic” case, i.e., the case where the parties and their relationship are “connected” to only one state. A choice of “foreign” law cannot operate so as to exclude the imperative provisions of the law of the country solely connected with the parties and their legal relationship. These are the provisions the application of which may not be excluded by an agreement of the parties (ius cogens). As already stated, this approach has been retained in both the Proposal and the Compromise in Article 3 paragraph 4.​[49]​ 
A new provision relating to the rules which cannot be derogated from by the parties was introduced in Article 4 paragraph 5 of the Proposal, concerning imperative norms of Community law. It provides that a choice of a non-member state’s law “shall be without prejudice to the application of such mandatory rules of Community law as are applicable to the case”. The idea that a fraudulent evasion of EC law should be prevented has presumably been retained in the Compromise, but the wording of this provision has been changed. Unfortunately, the provision in the Compromise uses a wording which is not entirely clear. Article 3 paragraph 5 reads as follows:

“Where (…) all other elements relevant to the situation at the time of the choice 	are located in one or more Member States, the parties choice of the law applicable 	other than that of a Member State shall not prejudice the application of provisions 	of Community law, where appropriate, as implemented in the Member State of 	the forum, which cannot be derogated from by the agreement.”

In other words, it follows that:

(a) As long as all elements of a particular relationship are located in one or more EU member sate, the imperative norms of Community law, which cannot be derogated from by an agreement of the parties, may not be evaded by the parties’ choice for the law of a non-member State.

(b) Thereby, the relevant rules of Community law, as implemented in the Member State of the forum, shall be applied, where appropriate.

First of all, it is questionable whether the applicability of EC norms should to be dealt with in the context of Article 3. It seems better to deal with this in Article 8.​[50]​ In any case, the provision contained in the Proposal addressed this issue in a more suitable manner. In particular, it is unnecessary to go as far as to determine the manner in which a particular part of EC legislation is implemented in a certain member state. Should a problem relating to a different way of implementation become an issue, it would be better to deal with such matters on a case by case basis. Finally, although it seems easiest from a practical point of view, it is questionable whether the manner in which relevant provisions are implemented in the forum EU state should be relevant here. This is particularly so when the jurisdiction of the court is based on a forum-selection clause. Usually, it is an expression of the will of the parties to have court proceedings in a “third”, neutral country, which otherwise does not have to have any connection with the parties or the contract. Why should the way in which the relevant EC regulation is implemented in the member state of the forum prevail over the way it is implemented in a member state which is closely related to the parties and their relationship? This is particularly so considering that Article 8 deals, inter alia, with mandatory norms of a forum state. 
Furthermore, it is not clear what meaning should be given to the wording ‘where appropriate’ in the context of this provision. Different interpretations of these words are possible. First, it can be interpreted so as to imply that the manner in which EC legislation is implemented in the forum state always applies when it is “appropriate” to apply the relevant provisions of EU law. If, however, these words are to imply that the presumption in favour of the way of implementation in the forum state is not absolute (but apply only “where appropriate”), it would have been much better to clarify when the way in which the relevant provisions are implemented in the member state of the forum would be appropriate to be applied. Similarly, the relevant law of which member state, implementing EU legislation, should be applied when it is not appropriate to consider the manner of implementation in the forum state is also not clear.
Finally, it is questionable whether this provision is needed if the provision of Article 22 of the Proposal, entitled “Relationship with other provisions of Community law”, is to be included in the final text of Rome I. The latter provision is likely to be the subject of further discussion, as it does not form part of the Compromise.​[51]​   
The provisions on “mandatory rules”, contained in Article 8 of the Proposal, are different in nature from those in Article 3 paragraphs 4 and 5 of the Proposal. It is obvious that the content of these rules is narrower than that of the rules meant in Article 3 of the Proposal. This is particularly so considering the definition of mandatory rules introduced by the Proposal, which is based on the case law of the European Court of Justice in paragraph 1 of Article 8.​[52]​ These are defined as the rules which a state considers crucial “for safeguarding its political, social or economic organisation to such an extent that they are applicable to any situation falling within their scope irrespective of the law otherwise applicable to the contract under this regulation”.
Other provisions contained in Article 8 of the Proposal closely follow Article 7 of the Rome Convention on mandatory rules of the lex fori​[53]​ and mandatory rules of a state closely connected with the dispute.​[54]​ The wording of Article 8 is still subject to the discussion and the provision on “overriding mandatory provisions” not forming part of the Compromise.​[55]​ The idea is to address the relation between Article 3 paragraph 4 and paragraph 5 in a recital, once the discussions on Article 8 are finalized.​[56]​ It was to be expected that it would remain a controversial issue, considering that a number of states had made reservations to Article 7(1) of the Rome Convention.​[57]​ As already stated, it would have been better to have dealt with the imperative provisions of EC legislation in Article 8.
 
4.2. Regulation for specific contracts

The wording in Article 3 paragraph 1 of the Proposal “[w]ithout prejudice to Articles 5, 6 and 7” clearly indicates that these provisions contain certain limitations to the parties’ choice of the applicable law for consumer contracts (Art. 5), individual employment contracts (Art. 6) and contracts concluded by an agent (Art. 7). 
	The wording of Article 3 paragraph 1 of the Compromise has been slightly altered, so that there is no reference to the provisions relating to specific contracts. Yet, these provisions do present limitations to the parties’ choice of the applicable law, but the manner and the scope of this limitation have been somewhat changed under the Compromise.

4.3. Individual Employment Contracts

The limitation to such a choice is clearly expressed with respect to individual employment contracts in Article 6 paragraph 1 of the Proposal. It clearly states that “[n]otwithstanding the provisions of Article 3” such a choice “shall not have the result in depriving the employee of the protection afforded him by the mandatory rules of the law which would be applicable under this Article in the absence of choice”. Generally, the wording of the provision in Article 6 of the Proposal closely follows the text of the Convention. To that end, it provides that a contract of employment in the absence of the parties’ choice will be governed by the law of the country “in or from which the employee habitually carries out his work in performance of the contract” (the lex loci laboris). The fact that the employee is temporarily employed in another country does not mean that the place of performance has changed. Different from the text of the Convention, the Proposal in Article 6 paragraph 2(a) introduced certain clarifications regarding the determination of the applicable law in the absence of the parties’ choice. In particular, it determines when work carried out in another country will be regarded as temporary for the purposes of applying this provision.​[58]​ In all other respects it follows the approach taken in the Convention, with a minor alteration in the text of paragraph 2(b). Thus, if the employee does not carry out his work in or from one country, “or he habitually carries out his work in or from a territory subject to no national sovereignty”, applicable will be the law of the country where the place of business is situated through which he was engaged. Just as under the Convention, the Proposal provides that if the contract of employment is more closely connected with another country, the law of this country shall prevail over the lex loci laboris.
	In contrast, Article 6 paragraph 1 of the Compromise follows more closely the text of the Convention, rather than the relevant provision of the Proposal. It does provide for the possibility for the parties to choose the applicable law. However, such a choice may not operate so as to deprive the employee of the protection provided for by provisions that cannot be derogated from under the law that would be applicable in the absence of the choice of law. In this context, there is an express reference to paragraphs 2, 2a and 3 of this provision. A recital should clarify that these are provisions which either cannot be derogated from or which can only be derogated from to the advantage of the employee. Further, a part of the text that had been contained in the Proposal relating to the meaning of “temporary work” is to be dealt with, according to the Compromise, in a recital, but this is omitted from the text itself.​[59]​ 




The Proposal introduced substantial changes in the regulation on the applicable law relating to consumer contracts. Most importantly, a choice of applicable law by the parties has been excluded. Instead, the Proposal provides for the applicability of the law of the state of habitual residence of the consumer (Art. 5 para. 1). For the purposes of applying this rule, the Proposal provides a definition of a “consumer contract”.​[60]​ It further provides that this rule will apply if the professional pursues a trade or profession in the Member States where the consumer has his habitual residence or directs such activities to that member state and the contract falls within the scope of such activities. However, the rule will not apply if the professional did not know where the habitual residence of the consumer was, provided that this lack of knowledge was not a result of the professional’s negligence (Art. 5 para. 2). Also, it will not apply to certain contracts, such as contracts for the supply of services, contracts of carriage other than package travel and contracts relating to a right in rem.​[61]​ 
	It is unclear why such a regulation, excluding the possibility for the parties to choose the applicable law, was opted for. Comparing this approach with the relevant provision of the Rome Convention, the regulation under the Proposal is a retrograde step.​[62]​ The manner in which the choice of law is limited in the Convention provides sufficient protection to consumers. The same is true for the suggestion made by the ECOSOC to allow a choice of law in consumer contracts after a dispute has arisen, as has already been discussed.​[63]​ Such an approach has been taken in the Brussels I Regulation, whereby a limited effect is given to forum-selection clauses in consumer contracts (Art. 17), insurance contracts (Art. 13) and contracts of employment (Art. 21). Similarly, many arbitration statutes give only limited effect to arbitration clauses relating to disputes involving such transactions.​[64]​ Generally, consumer contracts are particularly considered when arbitration law reforms are discussed in a certain legal system.​[65]​ Even when no special regulation can be found in statutory arbitration law, the courts have often ensured that the rights of a weaker party are protected, thereby relying on the relevant provisions of civil law.​[66]​ 
Consequently, it is obvious that the rights of a weaker party to a contract, such as an employee or a consumer, should be protected. However, it is unnecessary to go so far as to entirely exclude the possibility to agree on the applicable law in consumer contracts as has been opted for in the Proposal. It is to be regretted that the provision relating to consumer contracts does not form part of the Compromise.​[67]​ If this issue is still the subject of discussion, it is to be hoped that it would result in a provision which resembles the solution under the Convention or expresses the suggestion by ECOSOC, so that the possibility to choose the applicable law is not excluded. Otherwise there would again be a different “treatment” of the freedom to choose the applicable law in consumer contracts when a dispute is settled by a national court in the EU and when such disputes are settled by arbitration. Namely, arbitration agreements will be given effect in some legal systems within the EU only if they are concluded after a dispute has arisen. The same is true in the case of a forum-selection clause according to the relevant provisions of the Brussels I Regulation. However, the parties to an arbitration agreement, the so-called submission agreement, would be free to choose the applicable substantive law. In contrast, the parties to a forum-selection clause, providing for the jurisdiction of a court in an EU member state would not have such a possibility, should the provision of Article 6 of the Proposal remain unchanged. There are no reasons to justify such a different treatment of the freedom to choose the law in the same type of legal transaction in court proceedings and by arbitration in the member states of the EU.    





The Proposal introduced significant changes to the conflict of law rules to be applied in the absence of the parties’ choice. The most important alteration to the relevant provision of the Convention was the introduction of strict rules on the law applicable to various contracts, whereby a flexible rule of the closest connection lost its primary application. Thus, in a contract for the sale of goods, the applicable law would be the law of the country of the seller’s habitual residence in the absence of the parties’ choice.​[68]​ No exception to such a rigid rule was provided for by the Proposal. It is worth mentioning that such a regulation can seldom be found in private international law rules contained either in international instruments or in national statutes. A similar provision can be found in the 1986 Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Contracts for the International Sales of Goods (Art. 8 para. 1).​[69]​ However, the exceptions to this rule are provided in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the same provision, in favour of the law of the country in which the buyer has its habitual residence and the law of the “third” state, when this law is manifestly more closely connected with the parties and their contract. No such exceptions are provided for in the Proposal.
	The same approach is followed in the Proposal with respect to other types of contracts. Thus, in the absence of the parties’ choice, the applicable law is the law of the country of the habitual residence of the service provider (subparagraph b), the carrier (subparagraph c), the person who transfers or assigns the intellectual or industrial property rights (subparagraph f), the franchisee (subparagraph g) and the distributor (subparagraph h). The lex rei sitae rule applies to a contract concerning a right in rem or a right of the user in immovable property (subparagraph d). However, a lease for the temporary personal use of immovable property for a period of no more than six months “shall be governed by the law of the country in which the owner has his habitual residence, provided the tenant is a natural person and has his habitual residence in the same country” (subparagraph e). The “specific performance” rule has been provided for in Article 4 paragraph 2 for those contracts which were not specifically mentioned in paragraph 1. The “closest connection rule” was provided under the Proposal only when the “characteristic” obligation could not be identified.
	This approach taken under the Proposal, i.e., the rigid and inflexible rule contained in Article 4, has been subject to criticism and considered as a retrograde step.​[70]​ The fact that it has been changed in the Compromise is to be met with approval. The Compromise does incorporate the “closest connection rule” in Article 4 paragraph 4. It provides that “[w]here it is clear from all the circumstances of the case that the contract is manifestly more closely connected with a country other than that indicated in paragraphs 1 or 2, the law of that country shall apply”. 
The “closest connection rule” is widely accepted in the private international law of many legal systems worldwide. As such, it has also often been relied upon by arbitrators who consider it to be a general principle of private international law. Thus, the Rome Convention incorporating this particular rule has sometimes been relied upon by arbitrators, even though they were under no obligation to apply the Convention.​[71]​
The Compromise in Article 4 paragraph 2 closely follows the regulation suggested in the Proposal regarding certain types of contracts, such as a contract for the sale of goods, a contract for providing services, a contract relating to a right in rem or to a tenancy of immovable property, as well as a franchise and a distribution contract. As in the Proposal, the Compromise provides that the law of the country where the seller, the service provider, the franchiser or the distributor has his habitual residence will apply in the absence of the parties’ choice. With respect to the concept “provision of services”, a recital should state that it should be interpreted in the same manner as when applying Article 5(1)(b) of the Brussels I Regulation. 
No substantial changes are suggested regarding the applicable law for a contract relating to a right in rem, except that it has been clearly indicated that it concerns ‘a right in rem in immovable property or … a tenancy of immovable property” (Art. 4(1)(d)). The exception to the latter rule is provided in Article 4(1)(e) and concerns contracts for a tenancy of immovable property concluded for temporary private use for no longer than six months. Regarding these contracts, the Compromise provides for the applicability of the law of the country where the landlord has his habitual residence, when the tenant is a natural person and has his habitual residence in the same country.
The Compromise clearly indicates that questions concerning contracts of carriage are not part of this Compromise. However, there is no such clear indication regarding contracts relating to intellectual or industrial property in Article 4(1)(f) of the Proposal. Namely, it is not clear whether it is suggested that this provision should be deleted or that it merely does not form part of the Compromise, but remains the subject of discussion.
There is a new provision suggested under (j) in paragraph 1 of Article 4 of the Compromise relating to a contract for the sale of goods by auction. It provides that the law of the country where the auction takes place will apply, if such a place can be determined. In addition, the Compromise suggests incorporating a provision relating to a contract concluded at a financial market, but indicates that it does not form part of this Compromise and needs to be discussed further.
A general rule relating to the applicability of the law of the country of the habitual residence of the party who is “to effect the performance which is characteristic of the contract” is contained in paragraph 2. This provision applies when the contract is not a contract expressly indicated in paragraph 1 or when it can be “covered by more than one of the points” listed under paragraph 1.
From the wording used in paragraph 3 of the Compromise “[w]here it is clear from all the circumstances of the case that the contract is manifestly more closely connected with a country other than that indicated in paragraphs 1 or 2”, it may be concluded that the closest connection is given priority only in exceptional circumstances. In other words, the approach used in the Compromise differs from the regulation under the Rome Convention. Namely, under the Convention there is a strong presumption of when there is a closest connection, a presumption which can be rebutted in certain circumstances. In contrast, under the Compromise the set of rules listed in paragraph 1 are “independent” rules the application of which can only be avoided in exceptional circumstances. Very likely, the purpose of such a regulation is to prevent distinct interpretations of the “presumption” and “exception” by the courts when applying the closest connection rule.
Finally, the closest connection rule applies where the applicable law cannot be determined according to the rules contained in paragraphs 1 and 2.
As already indicated, the regulation suggested in the Compromise is more appropriate than the provision initially drafted in the Proposal. Yet, it is questionable whether any alteration to Article 4 of the Convention is necessary. It is true that this provision has been the subject of distinct interpretations by national courts in different member states. However, a risk of such diversity of interpretations has already been diminished, considering that the European Court of Justice since 2004 has competence to interpret the Rome Convention. As soon as the Convention is converted into a regulation, the national courts of all member states will be able to request preliminary rulings from the European Court of Justice, including those member states in which the Rome Convention has not yet been enforced.       

5.2. Specific regulation for certain types of contracts









To date, the Rome Convention is only applicable in 17 member states of the EU.​[75]​ It seems that there is still a long way to go until unified conflict of law rules for international contracts will be applicable in all 27 member states. The discussion has not yet been finalized. The Proposal and the Compromise will be – as announced – complemented with additional compromises. Then the final version of the Rome I Regulation is to be adopted. The proposed rules are partly to be welcomed, partly to be criticized. In comparing both documents it can be concluded that, generally, the provisions contained in the Compromise can be considered to be an improvement to the text of the Proposal. Besides certain minor alterations and clarifications in particular relating to the scope of application in Article 1, the Compromise has introduced some significant changes to the Proposal. 
The alteration introduced to the rigid rule on the determination of the applicable law in the absence of the parties’ choice as contained in Article 4 is particularly to be welcomed. The same is true regarding the changes to the provision on the assumption of an implied choice of law by the parties, according to which a choice of forum would imply a choice of law. It is more appropriate to consider a forum-selection clause together with other relevant points when trying to determine the real will of the parties in choosing the applicable law. 
However, it is to be regretted that the Compromise limits the parties’ freedom of choice so as to exclude the possibility to choose a non-national law to govern their contracts. This is particularly so bearing in mind that the vast majority of the EU member states do allow such a possibility for the parties in arbitration proceedings. It is difficult to find reasons why the same principle of contract law – party autonomy – should be given a different meaning and scope in arbitration and in litigation in the EU member states.
Finally, it is to be regretted that the Compromise has not addressed some controversial provisions of the Proposal, in particular the provision relating to consumer contracts and the provision on the mandatory law of a third state. These matters will be the subject of further discussion. It is to be hoped that the provisions of the Proposal excluding the possibility for the parties to choose the applicable law in consumer contracts will be altered.
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